Integrative Realism
Integrative Dual-Aspect Monism — a two-axiom philosophy of consciousness, written from the bedside.
Integrative Realism (formally Integrative Dual-Aspect Monism) is a metaphysical system developed by Michael L. Adix II, MD, in the two-volume work What We Are (2026). It holds that reality has a single nature with two inseparable faces: a structural face, described by physics with cumulative accuracy, and an intrinsic face, which is what consciousness is made of. Complex phenomena — including mind — arise from simpler constituents through integration. The whole system is built from two axioms and nothing else.
The Two Axioms
Everything in Integrative Realism follows from two foundational claims.
Axiom I — The Dual-Aspect Claim. Reality has both structural-relational properties, described by physics, and intrinsic properties that are proto-experiential — in the family of conscious experience, but rudimentary. Neither face reduces to the other; the two are inseparable, related as the convex and concave sides of one curve.
Axiom II — The Integration Principle. Complexity arises from simplicity through progressive integration. No new fundamental kind of thing appears along the way; what changes is how simpler elements already present are organized.
Where It Begins: The Bedside
The system starts from a gap a neurointerventional surgeon meets daily. Under anesthesia, consciousness dissolves; when the drugs clear, it reconstitutes. The imaging captures every structural detail and never the experience itself. That distance — between a complete physical description of a system and what it is like to be that system — is where Integrative Realism begins, and it treats the gap not as a temporary limit of science but as a permanent feature of what structural inquiry can reach. Every position in the system was first stated in its strongest opposing form, then tested against it.
What Integrative Realism Says About the Big Questions
Consciousness and the hard problem — Integrative Realism reframes the hard problem rather than claiming to solve it. The problem arises only if you assume the physical world is exhausted by structure; drop that assumption, and the question shifts from "how does experience arise from non-experiential matter?" to "how does experiential character integrate into a unified point of view?" — a question the framework addresses directly.
The self — The self is neither a soul nor an illusion. It is a process — a real, continuously maintained pattern that models itself, best pictured as a whirlpool: unmistakably real, but not a thing separable from the water it is made of.
Free will — Integrative Realism defends a compatibilist account. Freedom is not the absence of causation but a particular kind of it — one that routes through your own capacity to evaluate your desires and act on the ones you endorse. It is a matter of degree, proportional to the depth of that self-reflection.
Time — Time is not an inert backdrop. At the base lies a proto-temporal dimension within the intrinsic face; the experienced present is a sustained achievement of integration, not a knife-edge instant.
Machine consciousness — The framework neither rules machine consciousness in nor out. Because consciousness depends on the integration of a proto-experiential nature rather than on any particular material, whether an AI is conscious becomes an empirical question — and a hard one, because its structural face is increasingly transparent while its intrinsic face, if any, lies where the framework says it must: beyond third-person description.
How Integrative Realism Differs From Neighboring Views
Integrative Realism shares ground with several neighboring views but parts from each at a specific point.
Physicalism
Its claim · Reality is exhausted by physical structure; consciousness reduces to it, or is an illusion.
How Integrative Realism differs · It keeps physics fully authoritative about structure but denies that structure is all there is — the intrinsic face is real and irreducible. It judges the "illusion" view self-defeating: an illusion of consciousness is already a conscious experience.
Substance dualism
Its claim · Mind and matter are two different kinds of substance.
How Integrative Realism differs · It is a monism: one nature with two faces, not two things. There is no mind–matter interaction problem to solve, because there is a single process described two ways.
Panpsychism
Its claim · Experience is fundamental; the basic constituents of reality are themselves tiny subjects.
How Integrative Realism differs · It places only experiential character at the base — not subjects. Subjectivity is an achievement of integration, which dissolves the "combination problem" that micro-subjects create.
Russellian monism
Its claim · Physics describes structure; the intrinsic natures that fill that structure are unknown and may underlie consciousness.
How Integrative Realism differs · It is a developed descendant of this view. It specifies the intrinsic nature as proto-experiential and proto-temporal, adds the Integration Principle that Russell never supplied, and carries a complete derivation across fifteen domains.
Analytic idealism
Its claim · Reality is fundamentally mental; the physical world is appearance within a universal consciousness.
How Integrative Realism differs · It refuses to demote physics to appearance. The structural face is as real as the intrinsic one; neither is a mere appearance of the other.
Integrated Information Theory (IIT)
Its claim · Consciousness is integrated information, captured by a structural measure (Φ).
How Integrative Realism differs · It treats IIT as the most rigorous structural measure available, but incomplete: it identifies real structure without explaining why that structure is accompanied by experience. Axiom I supplies what the measure leaves out.
What Integrative Realism Is — and Is Not
Integrative Realism is a form of dual-aspect monism, descended from Russellian monism, with an added principle of integration. It is not panpsychism (it posits no micro-subjects), not idealism (it does not reduce matter to mind), not physicalism (it does not reduce mind to structure), and not substance dualism (it posits one nature, not two substances).
Frequently Asked Questions
A few of the most common questions, in brief. Read the full FAQ →
Is Integrative Realism the same as panpsychism?
No. Panpsychism puts tiny subjects at the foundation of reality; Integrative Realism puts only experiential character there, with subjectivity arising later through integration.
Does it solve the hard problem of consciousness?
It reframes the problem rather than solving it, by denying the assumption that makes it look impossible.
Is this a scientific theory or a philosophy?
It is a philosophical framework that takes science seriously: it treats physics as fully authoritative about structure and is built to be consistent with the best work in neuroscience and physics.
Who created it?
Michael L. Adix II, MD, a neurointerventional surgeon, in the two-volume What We Are (2026).
Key Terms
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Structural face — the relational, measurable side of reality that physics describes.
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Intrinsic face — what the bearers of that structure are in themselves; the side that is "what consciousness is made of."
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Integration — the progressive organizing of simpler elements into more complex wholes; the source of all complexity, including mind.
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Proto-experiential — having experiential character in a rudimentary form, without being a subject.
Where to Read More
Integrative Realism is developed in full in What We Are: A Personal Philosophy for the Age of Science:
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Volume I: The Nature of Reality — Intrinsic Press, 2026. ISBN [ADD PAPERBACK ISBN].
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Volume II: The Integrated Life — Intrinsic Press, 2026. ISBN [ADD PAPERBACK ISBN].
A free scholarly summary is openly available:
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Integrative Realism: A Précis — Download from the link below; also on Zenodo, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20685195; also on PhilArchive.
Written by Michael L. Adix II, MD, neurointerventional surgeon and author of What We Are. ORCID 0009-0008-0392-8898.
Published June 8, 2026 · Last updated June 2026.
What We Are · Volume I: The Nature of Reality
ISBN 979-8-950262-00-5 (Paperback), 979-8-950262-06-7 (Hardcover), 979-8-950262-02-9 (Ebook)
What We Are · Volume II: The Integrated Life
ISBN 979-8-950262-03-6 (Paperback), 979-8-950262-04-3 (Hardcover), 979-8-950262-07-4 (KDP Hardcover), 979-8-950262-05-0 (Ebook)
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